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Abstract 
Presenting a blank lineup—containing only fillers—to witnesses prior to showing a real 
lineup might be useful for screening out those who pick from the blank lineup as unreliable 
witnesses. We show that the effectiveness of this procedure varies depending on instructions 
given to witnesses. Participants (N = 462) viewed a simulated crime and attempted to identify 
the perpetrator from a lineup approximately one week later. Rejecting a blank lineup was 
associated with greater identification accuracy and greater diagnosticity of suspect 
identifications, but only when witnesses were instructed prior to the blank lineup that they 
would view a series of lineups; the procedure was ineffective for screening when witnesses 
were advised they would view two lineups or received no instruction. These results highlight 
the importance of instructions used in the blank lineup procedure, and the need for better 
understanding of how to interpret choosing patterns in this paradigm. 
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Eyewitness errors can have devastating consequences in the criminal justice system 
(e.g., Innocence Project, 2018). To mitigate the impact of eyewitness errors, researchers have 
attempted to develop procedures that enhance the accuracy of identification decisions, and 
help legal professionals evaluate the likely accuracy of identification decisions (e.g., Wells et 
al., 1998). One example is the blank lineup procedure (Wells, 1984). Prior to showing the 
witness a lineup that contains the police suspect (the real lineup), the witness is shown an 
additional lineup that contains only known-to-be-innocent fillers (the blank lineup). This 
procedure was designed as a method of screening witnesses in terms of the reliability of their 
identification decisions. Witnesses who choose from the blank lineup (initial choosers) can 
be screened out as poor witnesses who tend to pick from lineups too liberally and likely have 
poor memories of the culprit. Those who reject the blank lineup (initial non-choosers) can be 
regarded as relatively reliable. (Note that this does not imply that identification evidence from 
initial non-choosers should be assumed to be accurate; it must be evaluated, and other case 
evidence taken into account.) 
The blank lineup procedure has received little attention from researchers and has not 
come into common use in police investigations, perhaps in part because at the time of 
development, there were practical constraints on the ability of investigators to locate suitable 
fillers for an extra lineup (Lindsay & Wells, 1985). However, there is legal precedent for 
courts to uphold a suspect’s request for a blank lineup procedure to be used (Hibel, 2006; 
United States v Crouch, 1979; United States v Tyler, 1989), and the increasing availability of 
large databases of filler photographs and the use of computer-administered photo- or video-
lineups (e.g., Cutler, Daugherty, Babu, Hodges, & Van Wallendael, 2009; Memon, Harvard, 
Clifford, Gabbert, & Watt, 2011) mean that procedures involving multiple lineups are now 
much more feasible for use in police investigations (Palmer, Brewer, & Weber, 2012). 
We refined the blank lineup procedure by modifying the instructions given to 
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witnesses. Prior research—described below—has shown that various cognitive mechanisms 
influence witnesses’ responses to a blank lineup and a subsequent real lineup. Our premise 
was that the specific instructions given to witnesses would influence the operation of these 
different mechanisms; the goal was to develop instructions that would enhance the usefulness 
of the blank lineup procedure as a screening tool for evaluating the reliability of witnesses. 
Cognitive Processes in the Blank Lineup Procedure 
Relative versus Absolute Judgment Strategies. In the original rationale for the 
blank lineup procedure, Wells (1984) distinguished between two types of decision strategies 
that eyewitnesses could adopt when viewing a lineup. With an absolute judgment strategy, 
identification decisions are based on the degree of match between the lineup members and the 
witness’s memory of the perpetrator. With a relative judgment strategy, witnesses compare 
lineup members and choose the one that most closely resembles their memory of the 
perpetrator, regardless of the degree of match. Relative judgments increase the likelihood that 
innocent suspects will be falsely identified because, when the culprit is not in the lineup, 
witnesses tend to choose the best available lineup member (Wells, 1993). Any given 
identification decision is unlikely to be wholly relative or absolute, but the proportional 
contribution of the two processes can vary such that some decisions involve more relative 
judgment than do others. Although there is debate about the definition of these processes and 
the extent to which they can explain identification decisions (see below), the relative-absolute 
distinction has been highly influential in eyewitness research (e.g., Clark, 2003; Fife, Perry, 
& Gronlund, 2014; Lindsay & Wells, 1985). 
Although Wells (1984) conceptualized different judgment strategies as a distinction 
between relative and absolute judgments, more recently it has been suggested that judgment 
strategies might be better understood in terms of criterion placement (Moreland & Clark, 
2020; Wixted & Mickes, 2014). As such, eyewitnesses may have a propensity to provide 
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either a positive identification or lineup rejection. Those biased towards choosing a member 
from the lineup set a more lenient criterion. Alternatively, with cautious responding, stronger 
evidence is needed before the witness provides a positive identification. In the present 
context, the use of a blank lineup might be construed as a way of measuring bias to choose. 
Moreover, given that the decision criterion adopted by eyewitness can be influenced through 
experimental manipulations (Wixted & Mickes, 2014), the instructions accompanying the 
blank lineup procedure might constitute a manipulation of criterion. 
Responses to a blank lineup might also be informative about discriminability 
(Moreland & Clark, 2020); that is, the ability of witnesses to distinguish the target from other 
lineup members. Wells (1984) argued that the tendency to choose from or reject a lineup was 
also related to the strength of a witness’s memory for the culprit, such that rejecting the blank 
lineup is an indicator of those with stronger memories of the culprit, who are better able to 
discriminate guilty suspects from innocent suspects and fillers. Conversely, choosing from 
the blank lineup reflects poorer discriminability, and indicates that a witness is likely to 
perform worse on a subsequent real lineup task compared to witnesses who rejected a blank 
lineup. Consistent with these ideas, Wells found that, compared to initial non-choosers, initial 
choosers—on average—made more false identifications from target-absent lineups and fewer 
correct identifications from target-present lineups (see also Palmer et al., 2012; but see 
Moreland & Clark, 2020, for evidence that relative judgments can produce greater 
discriminability than absolute). 
In addition to providing a means of evaluating witnesses, it could be argued that the 
blank lineup procedure might improve identification performance by better preparing 
eyewitnesses for a subsequent judgment on a second lineup. For example, viewing the blank 
lineup might help participants learn the characteristics that are diagnostic of suspect guilt, or 
to adjust their decision criterion as a result of gaining an idea of the difficulty of the 
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identification task. However, such expectations must be tempered by evidence suggesting 
that identification performance tends to suffer when witnesses perform multiple identification 
attempts for the same suspect, even if the suspect does not appear repeatedly (as is the case 
with a blank lineup; e.g., Palmer, Brewer, & Weber, 2010; Smalarz, Kornell, Vaughn, & 
Palmer, 2019). 
Confirmation Bias and Commitment Effects. Identification responses in the blank 
lineup procedure are also influenced by confirmation bias and commitment effects (Palmer et 
al., 2012). Confirmation bias refers to the tendency to seek and process evidence in ways that 
support pre-existing beliefs or hypotheses (e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1987; Nickerson, 1998; 
Wason, 1960). Commitment effects can be considered a special case of confirmation bias, 
whereby commitment to an initial decision affects a subsequent related decision. For 
example, if a witness incorrectly recognizes an innocent person in an initial identification 
attempt (e.g., a lineup or a showup), the witness will be more likely to identify that same 
innocent person in a subsequent identification attempt, even if the real culprit is present (e.g., 
Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 2006; Dysart, Lindsay, Hammond, & Dupuis, 2001; 
Gorenstein & Ellsworth, 1980; Memon, Hope, Bartlett, & Bull, 2002). 
One way that commitment and confirmation bias effects manifest in the blank lineup 
procedure is that witnesses who choose from an initial lineup are predisposed to reject a 
subsequent lineup that does not contain the person they chose. Palmer et al. (2012) found 
that—compared to initial non-choosers and witnesses who did not view an initial lineup—
initial choosers were more likely to reject a second lineup that did not contain the culprit, and 
that incorrect rejections of a second lineup were faster when made by initial choosers than by 
other witnesses. These results suggest that, when faced with a second lineup, witnesses who 
picked from a previous lineup tend to process evidence in a way that confirms their earlier 
decision. This process could be underpinned by commitment effects (e.g., inferring that the 
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culprit cannot be in the second lineup, having already appeared in the first) and/or 
confirmation bias (e.g., selectively attending to features of lineup members that do not match 
their memory of the culprit, and interpreting ambiguous evidence as evidence of a mismatch). 
These results are important because they imply that the blank lineup procedure has 
limited efficacy for screening unreliable witnesses: Instead of predicting the likely accuracy 
of witnesses’ decisions regarding a subsequent real lineup, responses to a blank lineup might 
simply predict tendency to choose from the real lineup. Given the discrepancy in results 
between Palmer et al. (2012) and Wells (1984), it is worth considering characteristics of the 
blank lineup procedure that might limit confirmation and commitment effects and maximize 
the utility of the procedure for screening witnesses on likely memory quality. 
Refining Instructions for the Blank Lineup Procedure 
The way that confirmation bias and commitment effects operate in the blank lineup 
procedure likely varies depending on two aspects of the witness’s beliefs about the procedure. 
The first is whether the witness thinks a person from the first lineup can appear in the second 
lineup. If so, a witness who picks someone from the first lineup might try to recognize and 
pick the same person from the second lineup (as in other studies showing commitment effects 
across multiple identification opportunities). It is important to note that this would make the 
memory task more complex, because the witness would be comparing members of the second 
lineup not only to their memory of the culprit, but also to their memory of the members of the 
first lineup (Palmer et al., 2010). 
Second, commitment and confirmation bias effects also may vary depending on 
witnesses’ beliefs about the number of lineups to be viewed. If a witness thinks that there will 
be two lineups, choosing from the first implies that the person they are looking for will not be 
in the second (unless the same person they chose appears in the second lineup). Thus, 
witnesses who choose from a blank lineup should be less likely to choose from a subsequent 
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lineup. Conversely, rejecting an initial lineup may increase choosing from a second lineup. 
Rejecting an initial lineup does not imply per se that the culprit must be in a second lineup, 
because the culprit may be in neither lineup (e.g., if the police have arrested an innocent 
suspect). However, if the witness assumes that the police have arrested the correct person and 
decides that the culprit is not in the first lineup, they could infer that the culprit must appear 
in the second lineup. 
These beliefs—and, hence, the operation of confirmation bias and commitment 
effects—can be malleable using instructions given to witnesses about the blank lineup 
procedure. We consider several options. The simplest is to avoid telling witnesses in advance 
that they will be viewing more than one lineup, and only mention a second lineup after the 
witness has responded to the blank lineup. However, a clear practical drawback of this 
approach is that the witness might feel they have been tricked when told about the second 
lineup, undermining trust in the lineup administrator and potentially altering the way the 
witness responds to the second lineup. 
Another approach is to tell the witness in advance that they will be viewing two 
lineups. This would reduce the potential for the witness feeling deceived. If combined with 
information that no-one from the first lineup will appear in the second, this would also reduce 
the chances that the witness might attempt to recognize members of the first lineup when 
viewing the second. However, these instructions might exacerbate any commitment and 
confirmation bias effects. For example, if a witness knows that they are trying to identify one 
culprit from two lineups containing different people, it could make more salient the notion 
that the culprit can only appear in one of the lineups and, hence, if the witness chooses from 
the first lineup they must reject the second. 
A third option is to inform witnesses that they will be asked to view a series of 
lineups, without specifying how many. This approach is similar to telling witnesses before 
BLANK LINEUPS  7 
 
they view a showup or lineup that there may be additional opportunities to identify a suspect 
(Smith, Wells, Lindsay, & Myerson, 2018), and to “backloading” a sequential lineup to create 
the impression that there are more lineup members than actually exist (e.g., Lindsay & Wells, 
1985). A key principle behind these instructions is that the decision criterion for making a 
positive identification varies depending on how many chances for identification remain. The 
fewer the chances the witness thinks remain to identify the culprit, the more lenient the 
decision criterion becomes. Concealing from the witness the number of chances remaining 
undermines the setting of a lenient decision criterion, and typically increases the accuracy of 
identification decisions (Horry, Palmer, & Brewer, 2012; Smith et al., 2018). In the same 
vein, blank lineup instructions telling witnesses that they will view a series of lineups should 
limit confirmation bias and commitment effects by undermining any tendency to infer that 
the suspect must appear in either the first or second lineup. 
Variation in instructions may have contributed to the differences in results between 
Wells (1984) and Palmer et al. (2012). In Wells, participants were not told in advance they 
would view more than one lineup and were told prior to the second lineup “now we would 
like for you to look at a second lineup. Again, the person who took the computer game might 
not be present.” (p. 97). There was no indication that members of the first lineup would not 
appear in the second. Participants in Palmer et al. were told prior to the first lineup that they 
would view two lineups but were not told that the lineups would be for the same culprit 
(participants had seen a simulated crime with multiple culprits). Prior to the second lineup, 
participants were asked to again look for the same person and told that no-one who had 
appeared in the earlier lineup would appear in the second lineup. The knowledge that there 
would be two lineups may have contributed to commitment and confirmation bias effects in 
Palmer et al.’s data. However, this cannot be assumed, because other methodological 
differences may have been important. For example, Wells’ use of a biased blank lineup (with 
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only one lineup member being a plausible match for the culprit) and unbiased second lineup 
(where all lineup members were plausible matches for the culprit) might have prompted some 
participants to assume that the first lineup had been a trial run (Palmer et al., 2012). 
Regardless, the data from these experiments are consistent with the notion that instructions 
can shape the pattern of responses in the blank lineup paradigm. 
The Current Experiment 
All participants viewed a video of a mock crime and attempted to identify the 
perpetrator from a lineup approximately one week later. Compared to a short retention 
interval, this delay more closely matches conditions in real police investigations. It cannot be 
assumed that results obtained with a short retention interval will translate to a longer interval. 
Delaying eyewitness identification decisions can reduce memory accuracy (e.g., Palmer, 
Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh, 2013; Read, Lindsay, & Nichols, 1998; Sauer, Brewer, Weber, & 
Zweck, 2010) and prompt a more lenient decision criterion for recognizing stimuli as 
previously seen (e.g., Singer & Wixted, 2006). This has implications not only for witnesses’ 
ability to identify a culprit but also for how witnesses respond to a blank lineup: After a long 
retention interval, worse memory and a more lenient decision criterion may result in a greater 
proportion of picks from a blank lineup. 
We compared three versions of blank lineup instructions. Participants in the two 
lineups instruction condition were told in advance that they would be asked to view two 
lineups. Participants in the series instruction condition were told that they would view a 
series of lineups but were not told how many lineups there would be. Participants in the no 
instruction condition were not told in advance how many lineups there would be. Participants 
in a single-lineup control condition saw the “real” lineup but not the blank lineup. We 
hypothesized that confirmation bias effects would be most evident in the two lineups 
instruction condition, where responses to the first lineup would most easily give rise to 
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inferences about the likely presence of the culprit in a second lineup. In these conditions, we 
expected that choosing from a blank lineup would be associated with increased likelihood of 
rejecting a second, “real” lineup. Such effects were expected to be least evident in the series 
instruction condition, where concealing the number of remaining identification attempts 
should undermine inferences about the likely presence of the culprit. 
Method 
Participants 
Data were collected from 462 participants (282 female, 180 male) who were aged 
between 17-81 years old (M = 31.1, SD = 14.6). Participants were members of the public, 
recruited from the University of Tasmania (Australia) and the broader Tasmanian 
community, and participated voluntarily. The sex and age distribution did not differ across 
experimental conditions (all F and χ² values <1). 
Materials 
We used three sets of stimuli to promote generalizability of our results. Each set of 
stimuli comprised a video of a mock crime and an accompanying set of lineup photographs. 
The three videos depicted different scenes: a house burglary, a wallet stolen at a café, and an 
attempted car theft. The videos ran for 29s, 38s and 15s, respectively, and were non-violent in 
nature. All involved a single culprit with the café video featuring a female and the remainder 
featuring male culprits. A chi-square test to examine the distribution of stimuli across 
instruction conditions indicated no association between stimulus set and condition, χ²(6) = 
3.38, p = .760. 
The lineup photographs were colored head-and-shoulders photographs. Each set of 
photographs comprised one photograph of the culprit and 12 photographs of fillers, selected 
to match the description of the culprit (Wells, Rydell, & Seelau, 1993). For each set of 
stimuli, six filler photographs were randomly selected for use in the blank lineup. The 
BLANK LINEUPS  10 
 
remaining filler photographs comprised the target-absent lineup. For the target-present lineup, 
the photograph of the culprit replaced a randomly-chosen filler. Note that no photographs 
used in the blank lineup were featured in subsequent lineup presentations. For each lineup, 
photographs were presented simultaneously in 2 × 3 array. For culprit-present lineups, the 
suspect appeared in the top-right or bottom-center location (counterbalanced). The position of 
lineup fillers was counterbalanced across locations. 
Procedure 
Under the supervision of a student volunteer research assistant, participants viewed 
one of the three mock-crime videos, randomly assigned. Participants viewed the video either 
alone or in groups, while the remainder of the experiment was completed individually. All 
components were administered via a computer. During this initial phase, participants had not 
yet been assigned to an experimental condition; thus, there was no possibility of experimenter 
bias. Approximately one-week later participants received an email asking them to complete 
the remainder of the study online. Participants did this privately, without a researcher present.  
At this stage, participants were randomly assigned to view a culprit-present or -absent “real” 
lineup, and to a lineup instruction condition (no instructions, two lineups, series, or the single 
lineup control condition). Prior to each lineup, participants were asked to look for the person 
they saw committing a crime in the video (e.g., the girl who stole a wallet at a café) and given 
unbiased instructions that the person may or may not be in the lineup (for discussion of the 
effects of unbiased instructions, see Clark, 2012; Malpass & Devine, 1981; Steblay, 1997). 
Participants in the no instruction condition were told prior to the second lineup that 
no-one from the first lineup would be present in the second. Participants in this condition 
were not provided with any other information about the number of lineups to be viewed. 
Participants in the two lineups instruction condition received all the instructions for the no 
instruction condition and were told (prior to the first lineup) that they would be shown two 
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lineups and none of the faces from the first lineup would be present in the second lineup. 
Participants in the series instruction condition received similar instructions but were told prior 
to the first lineup that they would view a series of lineups (rather than two lineups). 
Participants were asked to make their identification responses by clicking the 
numbered circle corresponding to the suspect’s lineup position, or to click on the not present 
button if they thought the person was not in the lineup. Participants were then asked to rate 
their confidence in their decision on an 11-point scale from 0% (not at all confident) to 100% 
(completely confident). After completing the first identification decision and confidence 
judgment, participants were informed they would see another lineup and were asked to look 
for the same suspect. They were reminded the suspect may or may not be present and to click 
the suspect’s corresponding circle or choose not present. Participants were then asked to rate 
their confidence in their decision. 
Results 
 The proportions and frequencies for correct identifications, foil identifications, and 
incorrect and correct rejections for target-present and target-absent lineups are displayed in 
Table 1. At the outset, we note that the number of participants in some cells was small. Our 
total sample of 462 participants was split not only between the lineup instruction conditions, 
but also by whether participants chose from or rejected the blank lineup, with an uneven split 
between these responses in some conditions. As a result, cell numbers for some analyses were 
as low as 17, and our results should be interpreted with appropriate caution. 
Choosing Rates 
The choosing rate in the single-lineup control condition was higher than any of the 
blank lineup conditions. Across target-present and -absent lineups, participants in the single-
lineup condition (.60) were more likely to pick from the second lineup than initial choosers 
(.39), χ²(1, n = 279) = 11.52, p = .001, w = 0.203, odds ratio (OR) = 1.52, and non-choosers 
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(.32), χ²(1, n = 314) = 23.14, p < .001, w = 0.271, OR = 1.85. Thus, regardless of the lineup 
instructions or response to the blank lineup, viewing a blank lineup was associated with 
reduced choosing from the real lineup. 
Contrary to expectations, choosing rates were not contingent on the response to the 
initial lineup in any of the blank lineup conditions, χ²(1) values < 1.7,  ns ≥ 108, p values > 
.195. Thus, there was no evidence that choosing from the first lineup triggered an inference 
that the culprit could not appear in the second lineup. Given this unexpected result, we 
conducted additional analyses to examine the extent to which participants were consistent in 
their responses across both lineups in the blank lineup conditions (i.e., choosing from or 
rejecting both the blank lineup and real lineup). We predicted that choosing from the blank 
lineup might increase rejection of a second lineup due to commitment effects. However, there 
is evidence of individual differences in response bias, whereby some people are consistently 
more (or less) conservative in their recognition decisions (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012). Such 
individual differences might contribute to consistency in responding in the blank lineup 
paradigm; for example, people who are predisposed to set a conservative criterion might be 
more likely to reject both lineups. 
To test the extent to which this may have shaped our results, we examined different 
combinations of choosing across the blank lineup conditions: choose-choose (i.e., choosing 
from both the blank and real lineup), choose-reject, reject-reject, and reject-choose (see Table 
2). There was little evidence that consistency in responding played a major role in our data. 
Overall, 55% of responses were consistent (choose-choose or reject-reject), with almost 
identical rates of consistent responding in target-present (55.1%) and target-absent lineups 
(54.9%). A 3 (lineup instructions) × 2 (real lineup target presence) × 4 (choosing 
combination) hierarchical loglinear analysis indicated that—unsurprisingly—the pattern of 
choosing combinations differed between target-present and -absent lineups, with a higher 
BLANK LINEUPS  13 
 
proportion of reject-reject combinations for target-absent lineups than target-present, χ²(3, n = 
331) = 9.09, p = .028. The proportion of choosing combinations did not vary significantly 
with lineup instruction conditions, χ²(2, n = 331) < 1, p = .911, or the interaction between 
instructions and target-presence, χ²(6, n = 331) = 6.94, p = .326. 
Identification Decisions 
To address the extent to which blank lineup responses predicted accuracy on a second, 
real lineup, we compared initial choosers and non-choosers in each of the blank lineup 
conditions in terms of identification accuracy rates combined across target-present and -
absent lineups (see Table 1). Blank lineup response predicted accuracy in the series 
instruction condition, with a higher proportion of correct decisions made by initial non-
choosers than initial choosers, χ²(1, n = 108) = 4.21, p = .040, w = 0.198, OR = 1.56. The 
response frequencies (see Table 1) indicate that the accuracy advantage for initial non-
choosers in the series instruction condition was due to a combination of a higher proportion 
of (a) correct identifications from target-present lineups and (b) correct rejections of target-
absent lineups. In contrast, the blank lineup response did not predict real lineup accuracy in 
the no instruction condition, χ²(1, n = 109) = 1.61, p = .205, w = 0.121, or the two lineups 
instruction condition, χ²(1, n = 114) = 0.51, p = .476, w = 0.067. In fact, accuracy was 
numerically higher for initial choosers than non-choosers in these two conditions. Thus, the 
response to a blank lineup was indicative of accuracy on a “real” lineup only if witnesses 
were told in advance that there would be a series of lineups. 
To more closely examine the effects of blank lineup instructions on identification 
performance, we calculated signal detection measures of discriminability (ability to 
discriminate between targets and fillers) and response bias (willingness to pick from a 
lineup). We used a compound signal detection model (SDT-CD; Duncan, 2006) that has 
previously been used with eyewitness identification decisions (e.g., Palmer & Brewer, 2012). 
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We calculated inferential confidence intervals (ICIs; Tryon, 2001) to compare 
discriminability for initial non-choosers and choosers within each instruction condition (see 
Table 3). The ICIs showed that discriminability did not differ significantly between initial 
non-choosers and initial choosers in any of the instruction conditions. However, the pattern of 
dʹ estimates corroborated the pattern of accuracy rates: In the no instruction and two lineups 
conditions, dʹ was numerically higher for initial choosers than initial non-choosers. This is the 
opposite pattern to what would be expected based on Wells’ (1984) results and the rationale 
behind the blank lineup procedure. In contrast, in the series instruction condition, dʹ was 
numerically higher for initial non-choosers than initial choosers. With the caveat that the 
difference in dʹ estimates was not statistically significant, these results align with the accuracy 
data reported above: In both sets of analyses, the series instruction condition is the only one 
that produced any evidence of the blank lineup procedure operating as an effective tool for 
screening witnesses. 
Diagnosticity of suspect identifications. We also calculated diagnosticity ratios for 
suspect identifications. Diagnosticity reflects the informational utility of these identifications 
for assessing the likely guilt of a suspect (Wells & Lindsay, 1980). That is, given that the 
suspect was identified by the witness, to what extent should investigators adjust their 
judgments about the likely guilt of the suspect? Diagnosticity ratios are calculated as the 
probability of correctly identifying the suspect in target-present lineups divided by the 
probability of making an incorrect identification from target-absent lineups. For target-absent 
lineups, this probability was estimated by dividing the rate of foil identifications by the 
number of lineup members (see Brewer & Wells, 2006). The greater the ratio (over 1), the 
more probable it is that the suspect identified is guilty, while a value below 1 means the 
identification is more likely inaccurate than accurate. Within each instruction condition, we 
made inferential comparisons between the diagnosticity ratios for initial choosers and non-
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choosers by first calculating Cohen’s h for each diagnosticity ratio (representing the 
difference between the proportion of correct suspect identifications from target-present 
lineups and the proportion of incorrect suspect identifications from target-absent lineups). We 
then transformed the h values to z scores and evaluated the difference between initial 
choosers and non-choosers by calculating the 2-tailed p value corresponding to the difference 
in z scores divided by √2 (Rosenthal, 1991).1 
The pattern of diagnosticity ratios (see Table 4) suggests that, in the series lineup 
condition, suspect identifications made by initial non-choosers were more informative than 
those made by initial choosers. However, the comparison of h values for the series condition 
yielded a non-significant difference in z scores, z1 – z2 = 1.70, p = .089. In contrast, there was 
no evidence that suspect identifications made by initial non-choosers were more informative 
than those made by initial choosers in the no instruction condition, or two lineups instruction 
conditions. Not only did the inferential tests comparing h values for these conditions yield 
non-significant results (p values > .159), the diagnosticity ratios were numerically higher for 
initial choosers than initial non-choosers in both conditions. 
Comparisons with the single lineup condition. Wells (1984) found that accuracy on 
a real lineup was greater for witnesses who rejected a blank lineup than those who did not 
view a blank lineup. In our data, this was true only for initial non-choosers in the series 
instruction condition: The accuracy rate was higher for this group (.56) than the single lineup 
condition (.37), χ²(1, n = 194) = 5.71, p = .017, w = 0.17, OR = 1.49. In contrast, accuracy did 
not differ between the single lineup condition and initial non-choosers in the no instruction or 
two lineups instruction conditions, χ²s < 1, p values > .365. 
In terms of SDT estimates of discriminability and response bias, we did not make 
specific comparisons between the single lineup condition and each of the blank lineup groups 
                                                          
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this method of comparing diagnosticity ratios. 
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(the inferential confidence intervals calculated to compare initial non-choosers and choosers 
did not allow comparisons with the single lineup condition). However, estimated dʹ for the 
single lineup group (0.93) was numerically between the values for initial non-choosers and 
choosers in each of the instruction conditions, suggesting it is unlikely that the single lineup 
group differed significantly from any of the blank lineup groups in discriminability. 
Estimated response bias for the single lineup group was numerically lower (i.e., more 
conservative choosing) than all blank lineup groups, but the absence of inferential tests 
prevents conclusions being drawn about these comparisons. 
The diagnosticity ratios (Table 4) suggest that suspect identifications made by initial 
non-choosers who received the series instruction (but not those who received the two lineups 
instruction or no instruction) were more informative than those made by witnesses who did 
not view a blank lineup. 
Additional exploratory analyses. Our data contain an unusual pattern in the 
choosing rates for the blank lineup. Across all instruction conditions and final lineup types 
(target-present or -absent), participants chose from the blank lineup 45-48% of the time, with 
one exception: Participants in the series condition who saw a target-absent final lineup chose 
from the blank lineup 35% of the time.2 This result appears consistent with the idea that the 
series instructions might prompt witnesses to be less willing to choose from the first lineup 
they view. However, there is no apparent explanation for the variation between the target-
present and -absent conditions within the series instruction condition, because, to the point 
where they responded to the blank lineup, participants in these cells had received identical 
instructions. 
                                                          
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this unusual pattern and suggesting these analyses to 
explore it. 
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We considered this unusual result from two angles. First, we checked whether the low 
choosing rate in the target-absent series instruction condition might have been due to an odd 
distribution of stimuli in this condition. This does not seem to be the case, given that the three 
stimulus sets were represented approximately equally often within the target-absent series 
condition (burglary = 19; café = 16; car = 14). Second, we re-examined the results for 
combinations of choosing across both lineups (Table 2). Although the distribution of 
choosing combinations did not vary significantly between instructions conditions (or with the 
interaction between instructions and target-presence), the proportion of reject-reject responses 
was numerically highest for participants who received series instructions and viewed a target-
absent real lineup. Conclusions based on this pattern must be treated as speculative, but we 
note that this pattern is consistent with the notion that random allocation might have resulted 
in a greater proportion of conservative responders in this specific cell of the design which, in 
turn, might have contributed to the results for identification accuracy and discriminability 
(whereby initial non-choosers outperformed initial choosers in the series condition). 
Identification confidence. Another potentially interesting issue is the extent to which 
blank lineup instructions—and choosing from a blank lineup—might affect the confidence-
accuracy relationship.3 However, this issue was not our focus, and our study lacked sufficient 
data points per cell for confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) or calibration analyses (e.g., 
Brewer & Wells, 2006; Mickes, 2015). Exploratory analyses showed that, collapsing across 
conditions, correct picks (M = 51.13, SD = 24.78) were made with higher confidence than 
were incorrect picks (M = 43.73, SD = 24.86), although this difference was not statistically 
significant, t(193) = 1.85, p = .066, Cohen’s d = 0.30. We do not report this comparison for 
individual cells in our design; once we omitted participants who rejected the second lineup 
(because confidence is unrelated to accuracy for lineup rejections) and divided the remaining 
                                                          
3 We thank another anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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participants into those who made correct and incorrect picks, there were too few data points 
in some cells to draw meaningful conclusions about the effects of blank lineup instructions on 
the confidence-accuracy relationship. 
Discussion 
This research tested the idea proposed by Wells (1984) that blank lineups can be used 
to screen witnesses in terms of their likely reliability: that is, witnesses who reject a blank 
lineup will be—on average—more reliable than those who choose from a blank lineup. The 
results suggest that this holds true only when witnesses are informed beforehand that they 
will be asked to view a series of lineups. When these instructions are provided, (a) 
identification responses made by witnesses who rejected the blank lineup are more likely to 
be accurate than those made by witnesses who picked from the blank lineup, and (b) suspect 
identifications made by witnesses who rejected the blank lineup are—at least to some 
extent—more informative of the likely guilt than those made by witnesses who picked from 
the blank lineup. Additionally, these initial non-choosers are much better able to discriminate 
the target from fillers in the lineup. In contrast, if witnesses are told that there will be two 
lineups, or not given information about the number of lineups to be viewed, then choosing 
from a blank lineup does less to predict identification accuracy or the diagnosticity of suspect 
identifications from a second, “real” lineup. If anything, choosers provide slightly more 
accurate responses and greater discriminability compared to non-choosers in these conditions. 
Importantly, these results were obtained with a retention interval of approximately one week, 
more closely resembling the conditions of a real investigation than previous research on the 
blank lineup procedure. From a practical viewpoint and considering previous findings, these 
results suggest that if the blank lineup procedure is to be an effective screening tool, then 
perhaps instructions to witnesses should include a statement indicating a series of lineups will 
be viewed. We return to this point later in the Discussion. 
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A second notable finding was that the pattern of choosing rates in the blank lineup 
procedure differed from what was expected. We predicted that choosing from a blank lineup 
would be associated with reduced choosing from a second lineup due to commitment effects 
and confirmation bias. If there is one culprit, and the witness chose someone from the first 
lineup, logically the witness should infer that the culprit cannot be in a second lineup that 
contains different people (Palmer et al., 2012). However, this did not seem to be the case: 
Choosing rates from the second lineup were lower in all the blank lineup conditions than the 
single-lineup condition, regardless of whether witnesses chose from the blank lineup or not. 
This occurred even when witnesses were told explicitly that there would be two lineups, 
which should maximize commitment effects. Thus, although previous research shows 
evidence of commitment and confirmation effects (Palmer et al., 2012), the present data 
indicate that such effects do not always influence responding in the blank lineup paradigm. 
This pattern of choosing rates shows that the presentation of a blank lineup can reduce 
witnesses’ propensity to choose from the “real” lineup, regardless of whether witnesses pick 
from or reject the blank lineup. Why might this occur? One possibility is that the presentation 
of multiple lineups makes it more salient to witnesses that the culprit may not be present in 
any given lineup; if there are to be multiple lineups, then there must be at least one lineup that 
does not contain the culprit. The use of multiple lineups might emphasize this notion, over-
and-above the effects of unbiased instructions. Note, however, that the results of Palmer et al. 
(2012) do not align with this explanation: Palmer et al.’s data suggest that choosing from a 
blank lineup is associated with reduced choosing from a real lineup, whereas the current data 
suggest that simply viewing a blank lineup is associated with reduced choosing from a real 
lineup. This discrepancy highlights that factors affecting choosing in the blank lineup 
paradigm—and multiple lineup scenarios more broadly (e.g., Horry, Palmer, & Brewer, 
2012; Palmer et al., 2010; Smalarz et al., 2019; Smalarz & Wells, 2014; Steblay & Dysart, 
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2016)—are not yet comprehensively understood. Replication of the current study with larger 
samples should help in disentangling these factors. 
Given the patterns of choosing rates, it is important to acknowledge that our data do 
not provide a clear understanding of why the series instructions were important for the blank 
lineup procedure to be an effective screening tool. We expected that the series instruction 
(compared to the two lineups instruction) would minimize the impact of commitment and 
confirmation bias effects in responses to a second, real lineup. The data do not support this 
conclusion because the choosing rates provided no evidence that commitment and 
confirmation bias effects occurred, even given the two lineups instruction. This raises the 
question of what mechanism underpinned the effectiveness of the series instruction for 
screening reliable from unreliable witnesses? Our data do not speak directly to this issue. 
However, recent work by Smith et al. (2018) suggests one potential explanation: The series 
instruction may have influenced the way witnesses responded to the blank lineup, potentially 
creating slightly different groups of blank lineup choosers and non-choosers. Additional 
opportunities instructions prompt witnesses to respond more conservatively but—crucially—
this does not simply translate to reduced choosing; it can also increase accuracy. Smith et al. 
propose that, when faced with a culprit-absent lineup, witnesses tend to set an overly lenient 
criterion for making a positive identification. This is perhaps due to inflated expectations of 
the likelihood that the culprit will appear in the lineup (Wells, 1984; 1993). Instructions about 
additional identification opportunities curb this tendency by not only reducing choosing 
overall, but by reducing false identifications to a greater extent than correct identifications 
(beyond similar effects produced by unbiased instructions). 
In the blank lineup paradigm, such processes might alter the composition of blank 
lineup choosers and non-choosers. In the absence of a series instruction, witnesses who 
choose from the blank lineup likely include those with relatively poor memories of the culprit 
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and some with decent memories who pick due to non-memorial influences such as 
expectations about the likelihood the culprit will be present. If the series instruction 
undermines the tendency to pick from a blank lineup based on inflated expectations that the 
culprit will appear, then witnesses with a decent memory of the culprit will be more likely to 
reject the blank lineup. In turn, the difference in average memory quality between initial 
choosers and non-choosers will increase under the series instruction, enhancing the efficacy 
of the blank lineup procedure as a screening tool. However, we emphasize that this account 
remains speculative. Moreover, the blank lineup responses in the present study offer only 
minimal support for this explanation: Choosing rates from the blank lineup was numerically 
lower in the series instruction condition (.42) than the two lineups (.47) and no instruction 
conditions (.46), but this difference was very small, χ² < 1, w = .04. 
Drawing conclusions about blank lineup instructions is further complicated by the 
lower blank lineup choosing rate for witnesses in the series condition who would eventually 
be presented with a target-absent lineup. Although this choosing rate in the blank lineup was 
not significantly lower than any other condition, it is nonetheless possible that it contributed 
to our results. The additional analyses conducted did not shed any light on the matter, 
however we cannot ignore this peculiarity when interpreting the influence of the given 
instructions and the utility of the blank lineup. 
Could methodological differences account for the discrepant results across blank 
lineup studies? There are several differences between our study and that of Wells (1984). Our 
no instructions condition was closest to the design used by Wells, yet as aforementioned there 
was no meaningful difference between blank lineup choosers and non-choosers in the current 
experiment. If the blank lineup was a robust diagnostic tool for witness reliability, we would 
expect to see initial non-choosers consistently outperform choosers. Yet we did not find this, 
even in the condition closest to the original study. The blank lineup used by Wells was likely 
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more biased than the blank lineups used in Palmer at al. (2012) and the current study, and the 
retention interval in the current experiment was substantially longer than in previous blank 
lineup studies. However, it is unclear how such differences can account for the variation in 
results across these studies. Ultimately, it seems there are multiple factors with uncertain 
influences on the choice witnesses make in both the blank and subsequent real lineup. 
Conclusion 
Researchers continue to develop eyewitness identification techniques that promote 
accurate identification decisions and evaluation of those decisions. One such technique 
involves the use of a blank lineup to screen reliable witnesses from unreliable ones. Our 
research highlights that it cannot be assumed the blank lineup procedure will successfully do 
this. There are two aspects to this conclusion. First, our results suggest that for blank lineups 
to be used as a screening tool, instructions should include a statement that witnesses will view 
a series of lineups. We make this conclusion tentatively, due to the unusual patterns of 
choosing and discrepant results across blank lineup studies to date. Second, on a broader and 
more important level, it is becoming clear that we lack a good understanding of how the 
blank lineup procedure functions and how to interpret different patterns of responses in this 
paradigm. Developing such an understanding will be important for determining whether the 
blank lineup procedure can be used as a screening tool, and how to effectively implement 
this. 
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Table 1 

















  %                   n  %                   n  %                   n Total 
Single lineup    28.8             19  36.4             24  34.8             23 66 
No instructions  Non-chooser  11.1               4  30.6             11  58.3             21 36 
 Chooser  17.2               5  34.5             10  48.3             14 29 
Two lineups  Non-chooser  13.8               4  13.8               4  72.4             21 29 
 Chooser   32.0               8  12.0               3  56.0             14 25 
Series lineups  Non-chooser  25.8               8  19.4               6  54.8             17 31 
 Chooser  17.9               5  28.6               8  53.6             15 28 
Overall    21.7             53  27.0             66  51.2           125 244 






      Target-absent lineups 





      %                   n  %                   n Total 
Single lineup      53.8             35  46.2             30 65 
No instructions  Non-chooser    34.8               8  65.2             15 23 
 Chooser    19.0               4  81.0             17 21 
Two lineups  Non-chooser    28.1               9  71.9             23 32 
 Chooser     32.1               9  67.9             19 28 
Series lineups  Non-chooser    15.6               5  84.4             27 32 
 Chooser    35.3               6  64.7             11 17 
Overall      34.9             76  65.1           142 218 
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Table 2 
Proportions of different combinations of choosing across both lineups in the blank lineup conditions. 
Target-present Lineups 
 Reject-Reject Reject-Pick Pick-Reject Pick-Pick Total 
No instructions .32 (21) .23 (15) .22 (14) .23 (15) 65 
Two lineups .39 (21) .15 (8) .26 (14) .20 (11) 54 
Series Lineups .29 (17) .24 (14) .25 (15) .22 (13) 59 
Total .33 (59) .21 (37) .24 (43) .22 (39) 178 
Target-absent Lineups 
 Reject-Reject Reject-Pick Pick-Reject Pick-Pick Total 
No instructions .32 (21) .23 (15) .22 (14) .23 (15) 65 
Two lineups .39 (21) .15 (8) .26 (14) .20 (11) 54 
Series Lineups .29 (17) .24 (14) .25 (15) .22 (13) 59 
Total .33 (59) .21 (37) .24 (43) .22 (39) 178 
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Table 3 
Accuracy rates and estimates of d′ and c and associated 95% inferential confidence intervals (95% ICIs). Each 95% ICI was calculated to 
compare initial non-choosers vs initial choosers within a specific lineup instruction condition. For each specific pairwise comparison of initial 



































Single lineup  .37 [.30, .46] 0.93 - 0.74 - 
No instructions Non-chooser .32 [.22, .45] 0.45 [-0.12, 1.03] 1.25 [0.99, 1.50] 
 Chooser .44 [.31, .58] 0.98 [0.45, 1.50] 1.11 0.90, 1.33] 
Two lineups Non-chooser .44 [.33, .57] 0.76 [0.17, 1.34] 1.34 [1.07, 1.61] 
 Chooser .51 [.38, .64] 1.37 [0.90, 1.84] 0.98 [0.75, 1.21] 
Series lineups Non-chooser .56 [.43, .67] 1.47 [1.04, 1.90] 1.14 [0.94, 1.34] 
           Chooser .36 [.23, .50] 0.80 [0.25, 1.35] 1.09 [0.85, 1.33] 
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Table 4 
Diagnosticity Ratios for Suspect Identifications and effect size estimates (Cohen’s h) for the difference between the proportion of correct suspect 




Lineup instructions Blank lineup 
status 
Diagnosticity ratio Cohen’s h 
Single lineup  3.21 0.52 
No instruction Non-chooser 1.92 0.19 
Chooser 5.43 0.50 
Two lineups Non-chooser 2.94 0.32 
Chooser  5.97 0.74 
Series lineups Non-chooser 9.91 0.74 
Chooser 3.04 0.38 
